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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
-v-

:

DENNIS FIXEL,

i

Case No. 860151

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to dismiss the

information filed against defendant or to suppress evidence on
the ground that the police officer involved allegedly violated
the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-9-3 (1982)?
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction

of unlawful distribution for value of a controlled substance?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Dennis Fixel, was charged with unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1) (a)(ii) (Supp. 1983)
(amended 1985) (R. 16). After a bench trial, he was found guilty
as charged (R. 52). The court sentenced defendant to a term of
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, but suspended the
sentence and placed him on eighteen months1 probation (R. 53).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on March 5, 1985, an
undercover officer for the Provo City Police Department
accompanied David Kling to defendants resident in Pleasant
Grove, Utah.

After Mr. Kling introduced the officer to

defendant, the officer told defendant he wished to purchase some
marijuana.

Defendant indicated that half an ounce would cost

sixty dollars.

The officer handed three twenty dollar bills to

Mr. Kling who in turn gave the money to defendant.

Defendant

then left the room, returned shortly thereafter with two small
plastic baggies containing marijuana and handed them to the
officer.

Soon thereafter, Kling and the officer left (R. 79-84).

Defendant was subsequently charged with unlawful distribution for
value of a controlled substance (R. 16).
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion which
alternatively asked for dismissal of the charge against him or
suppression of the evidence obtained by the officer on March 5
(R. 23-28).

In the motion defendant argued that the relief

requested should be granted because the officer had not complied
with UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-9-3 (1982), a statute dealing with the
authority of a peace officer beyond his or her normal
jurisdiction.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion

(R. 68-68).
At trial, defendant admitted exchanging the two bags of
marijuana for the officer's sixty dollars.

However, he testified

that after receiving the money, he had gone to a neighbor to
obtain the marijuana; the marijuana given to the officer was not
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his, and he had not retained any of the money for himself (R. 9499).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant fails to articulate any grounds upon which
the trial court was required either to dismiss the charge against
him or to suppress evidence obtained by a police officer*
Assuming that the officer was effectively acting as a private
citizen, the evidence he provided at trial was clearly
admissible.
Because this Court misconstrued the pertinent
controlled substance statutes in State v, Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103
(Utah 1983), it should overrule that case and affirm defendant's
conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ARTICULATE ANY GROUND UPON
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED EITHER TO
DISMISS THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM OR TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY A POLICE OFFICER.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-9-3 (1982) provides:
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any
governmental entity of this state may exercise
a peace officer's authority beyond the limits
of such officer's normal jurisdiction as
follows:
(a) When in fresh pursuit of an offender for
the purpose of arresting and holding that
person in custody or returning the suspect
to the jurisdiction where the offense was
committed;
(b) When a public offense is committed in
such officer's presence;
(c) When participating in an investigation
of criminal activity which originated in
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such officer's normal jurisdiction in
cooperation with the local authority;
(d) When called to assist peace officers of
another jurisdiction,
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such
authorized action, shall notify and receive
approval of the local law enforcement
authority, or if such prior contact is not
reasonably possible, notify the local law
enforcement authority as soon as reasonably
possible. Unless specifically requested to
aid a police officer of another jurisdiction
or otherwise as provided for by law, no
legal responsibility for a police officer's
action outside his normal jurisdiction and
as provided herein, shall attach to the
local law enforcement authority.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss or to suppress
evidence, the prosecutor conceded that the officer from the Provo
City Police Department who purchased the marijuana from defendant
had not complied with § 77-9-3. Defendant contends that, under
these circumstances, the trial court should have either dismissed
the charge or suppressed the evidence obtained by the officer.
Although somewhat confusing, defendant's argument
appears to be premised on the notion that the officer, because he
failed to comply with § 77-9-3, could not validly have exercised
peace officer powers in Pleasant Grove City and thus was acting
as a private citizen when he purchased marijuana from defendant.
Concluding that the officer, in his capacity as a private
citizen, was acting illegally in making the buy (i.e., in
violation of the state's drug laws), defendant argues that the
trial court was obligated to grant him the relief he sought prior
to trial.

However, assuming that the officer was acting as a

private citizen, and in violation of the drug laws, that fact
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alone would not require suppression of the evidence he obtained.
A party to a crime often provides the evidence against another
party that leads to the latterfs conviction.

See, e.g.# State v.

Schreuder, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 46,

(1986).

P.2d

Although

his noncompliance with S 77-9-3 may have exposed him to criminal
liability or discipline from his department, the officer involved
could legally provide evidence against defendant.

Furthermore,

defendant has not articulated any violation of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution that would justify suppression.

See

Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-12(g) (1982))
(adopted by the Court in In Re Rules of Procedure, 18 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3 (1985)); State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972)
(recognizing the principle that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches or seizures does not apply to
searches or seizures by private persons).
All of the cases defendant cites in support of his
position are distinguishable in that they hold that an arrest or
detention effected by a police officer outside of his or her
jurisdiction was illegal, and therefore required dismissal of the
charges or suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of
the detention or arrest.

The officer who engaged defendant did

not detain or arrest him; he merely obtained evidence from
defendant.

Unlike the cited cases, the officer did not exercise

his peace officer authority in dealing with defendant outside of
his normal jurisdiction.
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Based upon the foregoing discussion, the trial court
properly denied defendant's pretrial motion.
POINT 11
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF DISTRIBUTION FOR
VALUE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
Relying primarily on gtate v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103
(Utah 1983), defendant urges that because the State presented no
evidence that he retained any portion of the money he received in
the drug transaction with the officer, the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction for distribution for value
of a controlled substance.

He suggests that the crime, if any,

was arranging the distribution for value of a controlled
substance under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1983)
(amended 1985) •
Defendant was charged with violating UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1983) (amended 1985), which provided:
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
and intentionally:
•

. .

(ii) to distribute for value or possess
with intent to distribute for value a
controlled or counterfeit substancel.il
Two sections within the definitions portion of the Controlled
Substances Act are important to the proper interpretation of §
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii).

Section 58-37-2(8) provides:

The word "distribute" means to deliver other
than by administering or dispensing a controlled
substance. "Distribute for value" means to
1 Minor word changes were made in subsection (a) by the 1985
legislation. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 146, § 1.
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deliver a controlled substance in exchange for
compensation, consideration, or item of value,
or a promise therefor. The word "distributor"
means a person who distributes controlled
substances.
Section 58-37-2(6) reads:
The word "deliver" or "delivery" means the
actual, constructive, or attempted transfer
of a controlled substance, whether or not
there exists an agency relationship.
Applying the first sentence of § 58-37-2(8) and the
definition of "delivery" provided in § 58-37-2(6) to the facts of
the Ontiveros case, it is clear that the defendant there was
guilty of distributing a controlled substance.

Under a literal

reading of the second sentence of § 58-37-2(8), it would appear
that he was also guilty of "distributing! for value," in that
there is no requirement that the distributor retain any portion
of the "compensation, consideration, or item of value" received
in exchange for delivery of the controlled substance.

In other

words, the distributor need only receive^ something of value; he
or she would not necessarily have to profit personally from the
transaction.

£f. State v. Leek, 26 Wash. App. 651, 64i P.2d 209,

211 (1980) (holding that under Washington's statute making it
unlawful "to sell for profit any controlled substance," "the
receipt of any item or thing of some worth in exchange for a
controlled substance is what is meant by the words "for
profit 1 ").

Nevertheless, this Court held that the evidence was

2

The word "receive" is used here as it is defined in Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary (1981), which is as follows:
"1.

to come into possession of"
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not sufficient to show that Ontiveros was guilty of distribution
for valuef because "Itlhe evidence only showled] that the
appellant acted as the officer's agent in making the purchase
from a third party,"

Ontiveros. 674 P.2d at 104.

Apparently, the Ontiveros Court took the position, as
have some other courts construing similar provisions, that the
"distribute for value" language contained in § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
does not apply to a person who is simply an intermediary between
the real buyer and seller.

See. e.g., People v. Lam Lek Chong,

407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678-680, 379 N.E.2d 200, 205-206, cert, denied,
439 U.S. 935 (1978).

However, such a construction was not

justified, given the clear definition of "distribute for value"
contained in §§ 58-37-2(6) and (8). The Ontiveros interpretation
imposes upon the state the nearly impossible burden, in many
cases, of proving that a distributor did not one hour, or one
day, or one week after the transaction deliver all the proceeds
of the "sale" to the "real" seller —

a burden not contemplated

by § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) and one that cannot validly be read into
it by this Court.

Cannon v. McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah

1980) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-11 (1978)) (noting that when
the construction of a statutory provision involves phrases
defined by statute, the provision must be construed according to
the definition); State v. Leek, 6 « P.2d at 211-12.
Furthermore, the Court's conclusion in Ontiveros that
the case was "a classic case of arranging to distribute a
controlled substance for value" is highly questionable.

The

classic case of arranging is best illustrated in State v.
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Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979) , where the defendant merely
arranged a meeting between the buyer (an informant) and the
seller; he took no part in either the distribution of the
controlled substance or the receipt of the money paid for it.
gee also State v. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983).

The

Ontiveros fact situation only became arranging when the Court did
not apply the literal statutory definition of "distribute for
value" to a transaction where the defendant apparently acted only
as an intermediary between the buyer and the seller.

In arriving

at the arranging conclusion the Ontiveros opinion also ignored
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(c) (Supp. 1983) (amended 1985)
(defining unlawful distribution for no value) which, given the
Court's interpretation of the "for value" language contained in §
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (which, the State believes, was incorrect),
should have been the section relied upon for reversing the
conviction, not the arranging provision.

There can be little

dispute that the defendant in Ontiveros committed an act that
constituted distribution as defined in § 58-37-2(6).
Based upon the foregoing discussion, and with all due
respect to the Court, Ontiveros appears to have been wrongly
decided and should be overruled in the instant case.3

The

evidence clearly established that defendant personally exchanged
a controlled substance for money —

an act that, under a literal

3 in a previous case now pending before the Court, State v.
Udell, Case No. 19641, the State seriously questioned Ontiveros
and argued that it should be limited to its facts. Upon further
reflection, the State now believes that Ontiveros should be
overruled as a misconstruction of the relevant statutes.
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reading of the pertinent statutes, constituted the unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance.

That defendant

may not have retained for himself any of the money he received in
exchange for the marijuana is inconsequential.

What is

significant, as far as § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) is concerned, is that
defendant physically received something of value in exchange for
the drug.

Although the language chosen and the sentence

structure used might have been better, § 58-37-8, as it relates
to this case, clearly defines several distinct situations under
which a person may be found guilty of a crime.

First, when a

person either distributes a controlled substance for value or
possesses it with the intent to distribute it, he is guilty of
the offense defined in § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Second, when a
person "agree[si, consent Is], offer[si, or arrange Is]" to
distribute for value a controlled substance or a substance in
lieu of a controlled substance, he is guilty of the offense
defined in § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv). See Hicken.
of those sections carries the same penalty.

Violation of either
§ 58-37-8(1)(b).

Finally, when a person distributes a controlled substance,
"wherein nothing of value is exchanged for such distribution," he
is guilty of the lesser offense defined in § 58-37-8(1)(c).
Under this scheme, the evidence was plainly sufficient to support
defendants conviction of distribution for value under the
offense defined in § 58-37-8(1) (a)(ii).
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s
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DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
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